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Taxing Systemic Risk 
ERIC D. CHASON* 
ABSTRACT 
A tax on the harmful elements of finance—a tax on systemic risk—would 
raise revenue and also lower the likelihood of future crisis.  Financial 
institutions, which pay the tax, would try to minimize its cost by lowering their 
systemic risk.  In theory, a tax on systemic risk is perfect policy.  In practice, 
however, this perfect policy is unattainable.  Tax laws need clear definitions 
to be administrable.  Our current understanding of systemic risk is too abstract 
and too metaphorical to serve as a target for taxation.  
Despite the absence of a clear definition of systemic risk, academics and 
policy makers continue to propose special taxes on finance.  The most 
prominent proposal is the financial transaction tax (FTT), which has some 
possibility of being adopted in the European Union.  The FTT and other 
similar proposals levy their taxes on proxies for systemic risk (for example, 
the volume of financial transactions or the size of financial institutions).  While 
these proposals would raise revenue, they would fail as regulatory measures 
(and could even be counterproductive).  While transaction volume and 
institutional size might be correlated with systemic risk, they are not causes of 
systemic risk.  By exploring each of these issues in depth, this article provides 
a useful starting point for the discussion on taxing the financial sector. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the passage of time and reform legislation1 since the end of the 
financial crisis, policymakers and commentators still worry about the risks that 
remain in the financial sector.  At the same time, governments in both Europe 
and the United States face deep budget deficits, caused in part by the financial 
crisis and ensuing economic dislocations.  Special taxes on the financial sector 
seem to address both concerns.  They would certainly raise revenue.  And, if 
they targeted risky practices and transactions, special taxes could even reduce 
the risk of future financial crisis.2   
The most prominent proposal is the financial transactions tax of the 
European Union.3  The tax would apply a low rate to the value of all financial 
transactions, similar in operation to taxes on retail and real-estate sales. 
1 Cf. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)) 
(purporting to “promote the financial stability of the United States” among other 
purposes).  
2  See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, The Financial Transactions Tax vs. the 
Financial Activities Tax, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 661, 661–62 (May 14, 2012). 
3  See infra Part III. 
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Economist James Tobin proposed a similar tax on currency transactions in the 
1970s, hoping to stabilize the turbulent flows of currencies that then plagued 
cross-border finance.4  Modern supporters claim that the tax would stabilize 
markets, diminish an overly powerful financial sector, and add much needed 
revenue to depleted public coffers.5  As of late March 2017, the financial 
transactions tax faces uncertain prospects for passage.6  
While motives of revenue (and perhaps revenge) support the tax, some 
view a tax on finance as having a regulatory purpose.7  The failure or distress 
of banks can harm the economy at large, not just investors and others who are 
directly connected to the bank.  Such harm is an externality justifying 
regulation and corrective taxes.8  Taxes on other externalities, particularly 
pollution, enjoy considerable support.9  Taxing pollution not only curtails 
pollution but gives polluters the flexibility on how to cut their emissions most 
cost effectively.  Theoretically, policymakers could regulate finance solely by 
taxing third third-party effects. 
The practical difficulties of corrective taxation, though, are daunting. 
Recall the problem just mentioned: failure or distress in the financial sector 
harms third parties.  A tax on bad outcomes would apply to a firm already in 
distress or insolvency.  Such a tax would be useless or even counterproductive, 
worsening the very distress that the tax should avoid. To be effective, a 
regulatory tax on finance must apply to activities that increase the risk of bad 
outcomes at financial institutions.  In other words, the tax must apply to 
4  See infra Part III.A.  
5  See infra Part III.A.  
6  See infra Part IV. 
7  Contributions include Douglas A. Shackelford, Daniel Shaviro & Joel B. 
Slemrod, Taxation and the Financial Sector, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 781 (2010); Reuven S. 
Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax and 
Other Regulatory Taxes (Univ. of Mich. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 216, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664045 [https://perma.cc/F9ED-7T66]; Narayana 
Kocherlakota, Taxing Risk and the Optimal Regulation of Financial Institutions (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Econ. Policy Paper 10-3, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616810 [https://perma.cc/9F6Z-DFTQ]; Beatrice Weder di 
Mauro, Taxing Systemic Risk: Proposal for a Systemic Risk Levy and a Systemic Risk 
Fund (Univ. of Mainz and Ger. Council of Econ. Experts, Jan. 25, 2010).  
8  See Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Taxing Financial Pollution, 126 
TAX NOTES 697, 699 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
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“systemic risk.”  This Article argues that mainstream proposals, like financial 
transactions tax, fail to do so.10  
Real-world taxes require crisp definitions, but crisply defining systemic 
risk is hard, even for the lords of finance.11  Part II starts abstractly, proposing 
to define systemic risk in terms of the social cost of firm failure or distress.12  
Losses borne directly by stakeholders (shareholders, creditors, or even 
employees) should not qualify as systemic risk, unless those losses spill over 
to the public at large.  Employees and investors at Goldman Sachs deserve no 
more special treatment than their counterparts at a bankrupt company like 
Blockbuster Video.  The rest of us, though, might suffer a lot more from 
Goldman’s demise than Blockbuster’s.  Conceptually, then, systemic risk 
includes two aspects: (1) the likelihood of firm financial distress occurring and 
(2) the impact financial distress would have upon non-stakeholders.  
Part III describes how a corrective tax on finance should work.13  It first 
looks to familiar arguments in favor of taxing externalities in general, and 
environmental pollution in particular.  Policymakers might control pollution 
by either limiting or taxing emissions.  Both methods could limit pollution.  
Only taxation, though, produces public revenue, and it also gives firms the 
incentive to reduce outputs in the most cost-effective manner.  In effect, the 
government supplies a price at which it sells the right to emit a unit of 
pollution.  The free market takes care of the rest.  Extending this model to 
systemic risk sounds attractive in theory.  In practice, though, the government 
must draft legislation that defines the tax base.  An environmental tax might 
apply to a metric ton of carbon output.  An income tax applies to a dollar of 
income.  A systemic-risk tax would apply to some measure of systemic risk or 
a robust proxy.  We must define it in a concrete, measurable way.  The 
conceptual definition of systemic risk previously described in Part II does not 
go far enough.  
Parts IV through VI14 examine three prominent proposals to tax finance, 
asking whether they adequately define and measure systemic risk.  None of 
the proposals appear focused on reducing systemic risk.  The financial 
transactions tax, discussed in Part IV, taxes every unit of currency (dollar, 
euro, pound, etc.) involved in a financial transaction.  But there is no reason to 
think that a unit of currency involved in a financial transaction causes systemic 
risk.  The Article makes similar observations about two other proposals: the 
                                                 
10  See infra Part IV. 
11  See Editorial, The Diviner of Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2010, at A14 
(describing difficulties of Ben Bernanke and Tim Geithner in defining systemic risk).  
12  See infra Part II. 
13  See infra Part III. 
14  See infra Parts IV–VI. 




financial activities tax (favored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) 
and taxes on financial leverage (favored by the Obama administration).  
As Part VII15 notes in conclusion, these failures are in execution, not in 
theory.  Better measures of systemic risk could well result in a successful 
corrective tax on finance.   
I. SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE GOAL OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
A.   Introduction 
 
Legal scholars often describe systemic risk metaphorically as a shock 
spreading from firm to firm and into the larger economy via a chain reaction.  
In his 2008 article entitled Systemic Risk, Steven Schwarcz defines systemic 
risk as:  
 
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or 
institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) 
either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or 
(Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) 
resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its 
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market 
price volatility.16  
 
Similarly, Hal Scott contends:  
Systemic risk has two distinct meanings.  First, it refers to a 
financial shock that has a simultaneous impact on a number 
of financial institutions.  Second, it refers to the chain reaction 
problem, the possibility that the failure of one bank will affect 
other banks.  To some extent, these two versions are 
interrelated; a major shock can trigger a chain reaction.17 
 
The metaphors of “shock” and “chain reactions” may well convey the 
essence of the problem.  Financial firms are interconnected and important to 
the overall economy.  Failure of one financial firm threatens the entire 
economy in unique ways.  Many argue that losses at one firm not only spread 
throughout the system but amplify as they spread.18 
                                                 
15  See infra Part VI. 
16  Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). 
17  HALL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 173 (16th ed. 2009). 
18  Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 213–14. 
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These metaphors may also help justify regulating, and taxing, financial 
firms as a way to avoid the shocks and chain reactions.19  But the design of a 
corrective tax would need to account for more than metaphor.  Traditional tax 
bases—like income, sales, and wealth—can be reduced to numerical values.  
Ideas like “shocks” and “chain reactions” cannot.  The rest of this Part seeks 
greater clarity in defining systemic risk.   
B.   Financial Intermediation 
1. Mismatch between Short-Term Financing and Long-Term Investing 
 
To understand systemic risk, we must understand what banks and other 
financial institutions actually do.  Your bank may call you a “customer” (or, if 
you are rich enough, a “client”), but you and your deposits are really a source 
of financing for the bank’s investments.  The classic use of bank funds is to 
make loans to homebuyers and businesses.  Readers might remember George 
Bailey standing down his panicked and homespun depositors in It’s a 
Wonderful Life: “[Y]ou’re thinking of this place all wrong.  As if I had the 
money back in a safe.  The money’s not here.  Well, your money’s in Joe’s 
house . . . that’s right next to yours.  And in the Kennedy house, and Mrs. 
Macklin’s house, and . . . a hundred others.”20 
Of course, businesses and individuals throughout the economy borrow to 
finance their investments.  What makes banks unique, however, is that they 
typically invest in long-term, illiquid investments but finance with short-term, 
liquid liabilities.21  The bank may invest in Mrs. Macklin’s and Joe’s 
mortgages, but the bank cannot demand immediate repayment, nor can it easily 
sell those mortgages in a market.  In contrast, the bank receives its funds (i.e., 
finances its investments) from depositors who may demand repayment on a 
moment’s notice.  The assets (mortgage claims against borrowers) and 
liabilities (deposits held for depositors) are mismatched. 
The important service that Bailey and other banks provide is financial 
intermediation.22  Mrs. Macklin wants a 30-year mortgage.  Her neighbors 
want a safe but accessible place to put their money.  Bailey takes in short-term 
deposits and channels the funds to long-term borrowers.  Doing so lets the 
                                                 
19  Id. at 232. 
20  It’s a Wonderful Life, Script, http://www.script-o-
rama.com/movie_scripts/i/its-a-wonderful-life-script.html [https://perma.cc/DNC2-
ZXPK]. 
21  See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 37 (4th ed. 2009). 
22  See generally Daniel A. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank 
Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 306–07 (1987). 




depositors diversify across lots of mortgages and business loans (not just Mrs. 
Macklin’s).  Bailey’s problem was that his depositors all showed up at once 
demanding to be paid.23  
2. Modern Variants on Bank Loans 
Modern banks still lend Mrs. Macklin money.  But rather than holding her 
mortgage indefinitely, they likely “originate to distribute.”24  A bank pools 
thousands of mortgages into a single portfolio, which is then sliced (tranched) 
into marketable securities for resale to investors. Different tranches have 
different priorities of repayment, with the senior tranche being repaid first, the 
equity tranche last, and the mezzanine tranche in between.25  The allure of 
tranching comes from the ability to place a high (e.g., AAA) credit rating on 
the senior tranche, making it marketable to conservative and regulated 
investors.  Mezzanine tranches carry a lower, less marketable credit rating 
(e.g., BBB), while equity tranches are not rated at all.  Creating “high quality” 
tranches is so alluring that banks reiterated the process, pooling the mezzanine 
tranches themselves into a new portfolio, which is itself then tranched into 
collaterized debt obligations (CDOs) of senior, mezzanine, and equity 
tranches.26  
Despite this process of securitization, much of the risks remained within 
the banking system, as banks were some of the largest buyers of CDOs and 
similar products.27  When real estate prices fell and borrowers began to default, 
banks could not exit these risks because no one else wanted to buy CDOs.  
Even senior tranches looked like toxic waste, not conservative investments.  
Banks discovered, at that time, that they had not successfully converted Mrs. 
Macklin’s long-term, illiquid mortgage into a liquid security.    
 
3. Modern Variants on Bank Deposits 
Much as modern banking shifted from Mrs. Macklin’s mortgage to CDOs, 
it has also turned to new sources of financing.  Modern banks still finance with 
traditional deposits, but they also raise funds through so-called shadow 
                                                 
23  See infra Sections I.C and I.D (describing how bank runs can destabilize the 
economy and how governments try to control them). 
24  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 447 (2011).  
25  See id. at 43. 
26  See id. at 71–72. 
27  See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 189 (8th ed. 
2011). 
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banking.  For example, repurchase agreements or “repo” allow banks to raise 
funds cheaply and quickly without the bother of obtaining a bank loan, issuing 
securities, or taking in deposits.28  Repo is secured lending: the lender buys an 
asset from the borrower, on the condition that the borrower buy it back at a 
slightly higher price in the future.  The term is very short, and the buyback date 
is often the very next day.29  Repo lenders might be other financial institutions 
and, indirectly, retail investors.  Money-market funds take in contributions 
from a wide array of investors (including individuals of modest means) and 
invest them in short-term, liquid debt instruments like repo.30  Money-market 
funds and deposits are regulated differently but function similarly, both giving 
short-term investors an accessible place to park their money while giving 
borrowers a source of financing.  
Banks and other financial firms came to rely heavily on repo borrowing to 
finance their investments in the years leading up to the crisis.31  Because they 
are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
however, repo lenders have far more incentive to react to bank distress than 
depositors.  Ordinarily, banks can rely on repo lenders to roll over their 
expiring loans or find new ones on the market.   During times of distress, 
however, repo lenders can walk away with their money at any time, which has 
the same effect as withdrawing a bank deposit.  One prominent account of the 
financial crisis calls it a “run on repo,”32 in which losses in the subprime 
market caused repo lenders to demand greater or higher quality collateral or 
simply to exit the market altogether.  Just as in a bank run, the bank does not 
have enough liquidity on hand to pay the borrowers.33  At the height of the 
financial crisis, the Treasury Department took the extraordinary step of 
guaranteeing money-market funds much like the FDIC guarantees deposits.34 
                                                 
28  Commercial paper is another form of short-term borrowing included in the 
shadow-banking system.  See generally id. at 787. 
29  See id. at 76. 
30  Id. 
31  See Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on 
Repo 1 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752 
[https://perma.cc/V7LE-J5G3]. 
32  Id. 
33  The lenders may themselves be retail investors who have bought shares of 
money-market mutual funds.  The funds act as conduits, taking in “deposits” from 
investors and using them to buy repo or other short-term assets from borrowers.  See 
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 24, at 30. 
34  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary 
Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/YUL6-KDEM].  




C.   The Fire-Sale Externality and Systemic Risk 
 
The prior Section shows why financial institutions tend to be unstable.  
They take in funds from short-term borrowers (deposits, repo) and deploy 
those funds in illiquid investments (Mrs. Macklin’s mortgage, CDOs).  If 
borrowers all want repayment at once, the bank may not be able to pay and 
could fail.  So far, though, this account simply describes what might happen at 
a particular firm.  Why should failure at a bank be a matter of public concern?  
Moreover, a bank run causes illiquidity not insolvency.  The fact that George 
Bailey’s depositors all want their money does not directly make Mrs. 
Macklin’s loan worth less.  Similarly, the fact that repo lenders withdraw from 
the market en masse does not make illiquid CDOs35 worth less.  
This Section describes how firm-level distress can spread throughout the 
economy.  The prevailing view is that excessive risk taking at financial 
institutions substantially contributed to the recent crisis.36  We need, however, 
some idea of what makes some risk taking “excessive,”37 why self-serving 
firms would subject themselves to it, and why it would actually affect anyone 
unconnected to the firm.   
A bank facing a run (either by deposits or by repo lenders) needs cash.  If 
the bank does not have enough cash on hand and cannot raise more through 
new deposits, repo, or the like, it will need to sell its stake in its illiquid 
investments: Mrs. Macklin’s mortgage, the CDOs, etc. During a panic, 
however, several banks are looking to sell and few are looking to buy.  Banks 
thus need to accept a lower value for the asset.  But doing so forces the bank 
to revalue all similar assets it holds, even if it is not selling.  The distressed 
sale affects the banks entire balance sheet.38  
                                                 
35  See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing CDOs). 
36  See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 24, at xix (“We conclude a 
combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency put 
the financial system on a collision course with crisis.”). 
37  Cf. Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 1 (2009), (statement of Kevin J. Murphy) (“Political pressures 
to reform pay have escalated in spite of limited evidence that compensation structures 
have, in fact, been responsible for excessive risk taking in the financial services 
industry.  Indeed, the pressures have emerged even without a definition of ‘excessive 
risk taking’ or how we might distinguish excessive risk from the normal risks.”). 
38  The analysis that follows relies heavily on Markus K. Brunnermeier, 
Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
77 (2009).  The Article enjoyed fame that few academics dream of when Fed Chair 
Ben Bernanke recommended it (along with two other articles and one book) for those 
trying to understand the financial crisis.  See Michael Corkery, Ben Bernanke’s Labor 
Day Reading List, WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. (Sept. 2, 2010, 4:18 PM), 
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To see why, suppose that a bank has assets valued at $100 billion, derived 
from repo lending of $90 billion and equity of $10 billion.  All of the assets 
are invested in CDOs.  Now, suppose that 10% of the bank’s repo lenders 
(holding $9 billion of claims) fear losses on the bank’s investments in CDOs 
and refuse to roll over their repo.  No one else is willing to supply new funds. 
The bank needs $9 billion of cash to repay these lenders.  
Repayment is no problem if the bank can simply sell CDOs at book 
value.39  But, recall that the market is concerned about the bank, so the bank 
might need to accept a lower price.  Perhaps the bank needs to sell 10% of its 
portfolio—previously thought to have been worth $10 billion but saleable for 
only $9 billion.  Initially, this discount might not look so bad if the bank is 
merely taking a $1 billion loss, which can be absorbed by its $10 billion of 
equity.  After the sale, it has CDOs of $90 billion and cash of $9 billion, right? 
Perhaps not, because the discount sale may cause us to reexamine the 
entire value of the bank.  The bank is selling some of its CDOs at a 10% 
discount.  Arguably, we should discount all of its holdings by that much.  If 
so, it now has CDOs discounted to $81 billion and cash worth $9 billion.   
Because it still has liabilities of $90 billion, its entire equity is wiped out, 
putting it on the edge of insolvency.  News of the bank’s distress panics its 
remaining lenders, who themselves seek to withdraw their funds (e.g., by 
declining to roll over their repo).  The second wave of discounts throws the 
bank into insolvency.  
This vicious cycle is the “run on repo” mentioned above.40  The cycle 
endangers other banks as well, who may be holding similar CDOs financed by 
similarly panicked depositors and repo lenders.  Discounted selling by one 
bank forces other banks to discount their holdings, making them appear less 
healthy.  Because the discounted selling affects other banks, it has been termed 
the “fire-sale externality.”41  We usually expect lower prices to attract bargain 
hunters, driving up demand and stabilizing prices.  But depositors, repo 
lenders, and other banks are all looking to get out of the market.  Without 
buyers, a “liquidity spiral” takes hold, making banking structures less stable 
and self-correcting than most economic activities.42  
The liquidity spiral does not directly affect bank borrowers like Mrs. 
Macklin.  She is unlikely to know or care if her mortgage has been sliced up 
and sold several times over.  Yet, her 25-year-old daughter, Miranda, might 
                                                 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/09/02/ben-bernankes-labor-day-reading-list/ 
[https://perma.cc/TX2Z-CDVE]. 
39  The bank’s balance sheet would have $91 billion of assets, $81 billion of 
deposits/repo, and $10 billion of equity.  
40  See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 31.  
41  See Brunnermeier, supra note 38. 
42  See id. 




not be able to find a loan for her new house.  Or, her law-firm employer might 
need to lay her off as tighter credit conditions drive down economic activity 
and the demand for legal services.  Instability, distress, and failure in banking 
can spread, inflicting costs upon society at large, not just the shareholders, 
depositors, and other stakeholders of a firm.43 This characteristic, known as 
systemic risk,44 explains how perhaps $1 trillion of subprime mortgage losses 
translated into an $8 trillion decline in the U.S. stock market and the worst 
economic crisis since the Great Depression.45  
In light of these costs, this Article will treat systemic risk as an 
externality46 that justifies regulation.47  A bank that poses systemic risk enjoys 
the full upside of its risk taking but is shielded from much of the downside.  
This asymmetry is far more pronounced in a bank than in a typical limited 
liability firm like a corporation.48  It is true that corporate shareholders, in all 
industries, enjoy the full upside of their risk taking while exposing their 
creditors to some of the downside.  However, corporate creditors are (for the 
most part) voluntary and screen their debtors for excessive risk taking.  
Corporate debtors who take on additional risk must pay for the privilege with 
higher interest rates.  In contrast, systemic risk burdens society at large.  
Absent regulation, society has no way of imposing higher costs on firms that 
engage in activities that produce more systemic risk.  
                                                 
43  See Schwarcz, supra note 16 at 206 (describing systemic risk as an externality). 
44  See infra Part I.A. 
45  Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: 
Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis, 124 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1449 
(2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304 [https://perma.cc/BA3D-5ZNF]. 
46  Cf. ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 352 (1995) (“An 
externality is present whenever the well-being of a consumer or the production 
possibilities of a firm are directly affected by the actions of another agent in the 
economy.”); DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 307 (1998) (“An 
externality exists whenever a person does not enjoy all the benefits or incur all the 
costs that result from the actions that person undertakes.”).  
47  One could similarly characterize systemic risk as a collective-action problem 
of shareholders.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay 
(Columbia L. and Econ. Working Paper No. 373, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633906 [https://perma.cc/E8B7-L8H5]. 
48  See generally FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996). 
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D.   Micro- and Macro-Prudential Regulation 
The traditional, and still dominant, form of financial regulation is “micro-
prudential” in that it seeks stability at individual firms.49  For example, suppose 
(like in the prior Section), a large bank invests in CDOs.  Before the bank’s 
repo lenders become alarmed, regulators identify the CDOs as being 
particularly risky.  Forcing the bank to sell the CDOs would decrease the risk 
of insolvency or distress at the bank. 
Following the financial crisis, however, many commentators have 
criticized the micro-prudential approach.50  In the prior Section, we saw how 
actions that stabilize one bank (selling risky CDOs) may destabilize the entire 
financial system.  Selling the risky CDOs in an illiquid market may be difficult, 
and the seller may need to accept a discounted price.  Other banks holding 
similar CDOs may need to revalue their holdings to account for the loss, 
making them appear less stable and making it harder for them to obtain 
financing.  Thus, by forcing one bank to sell its CDOs, regulators might make 
the entire system less stable.  In short, micro-prudential regulation may 
stabilize one firm but destabilize the entire system. 
Proposals for “macro-prudential” regulation would focus on such system-
wide effects.  A macro-prudential approach would tighten during boom 
markets when the system could most easily accommodate the side effects.  
During busts, regulation would ease.  To date, macro-prudential regulation is 
still in the development phase.  For example, some contend that the capital 
adequacy rules (discussed below)51 could be strengthened during booms and 
relaxed during busts.52  
Along these lines, some argue that a financial transactions tax could 
dampen the boom/bust cycle.  According to them, the tax could thwart the 
formation of financial bubbles by making trading more expensive.53  However, 
the recent financial crisis was sparked by a bubble in the U.S. housing 
market.54  Transactions taxes (on sales and deed recordations) already exist in 
                                                 
49  See generally CARNELL ET AL., supra note 21 (providing overviews of firm-
level banking and financial regulation).  
50  See, e.g., Piet Clement, The Term “Macroprudential”: Origins and Evolution, 
BIS Q. REV., Mar. 1, 2010, at 59. 
51  See infra Part I.E.2. 
52 See generally Avinash Persaud, Macro-Prudential Regulation (2009), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/337731468161952385/pdf/503470BRI0
Box31ponse0Note601PUBLIC1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNG7-82EE]. 
53  See, e.g., Thornton Matheson, Taxing Financial Transactions: Issues and 
Evidence 21 (IMF Working Paper WP/11/54, Mar. 2011).  
54  Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the 
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 120 (2009) 




this market and failed to prevent the crisis.  Similarly, a recurring problem of 
bank runs is that markets become illiquid.  Banks cannot find buyers for their 
illiquid investments, and transactions taxes would seem to make it even harder 
to sell at the margin.  
In short, the micro-prudential approach still dominates financial 
regulation, and corrective taxes have no obvious macro-prudential benefits.  
As a result, this Article will limit its analysis to the micro-prudential effects of 
corrective taxes on finance.  To develop this analysis, the next Section 
summarizes the existing system of (largely micro-prudential) regulation in the 
United States. 
E.   Financial Regulation 
 
Section C suggested that systemic risk is a type of externality for firms.  
Firms certainly suffer from financial distress, but banking is unique in that 
distress not only spreads but amplifies through the rest of the economy.  Thus, 
it is possible that banks would take risks that are privately optimal (even if they 
turn out badly for the banks) but socially destructive.  In order to control these 
risks, governments not only regulate banks but also support them in times of 
distress.  
Outside the financial sector, preventing default or insolvency is usually 
not a matter of public concern.55  The failure of a firm certainly causes 
hardships for employees, suppliers, and investors, but such “creative 
destruction” is usually tolerated, sometimes even welcomed, as an essential 
part of economic growth.56  Poorly run firms should fail and release their 
resources for better run firms to use.  For banks and other financial firms, 
                                                 
(“The general consensus is that the primary cause of the current recession was the 
credit crisis arising from the bursting of the housing bubble.”).  
55  That is not to say that the government never intervenes to protect failing, 
nonfinancial firms.  Most recently and perhaps famously, the U.S. Treasury assisted 
General Motors and Chrysler with its Automotive Industry Financing Program.  See 
generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-151, TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM: CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP NEEDED AS TREASURY DEVELOPS 
STRATEGIES FOR MONITORING AND DIVESTING FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN CHRYSLER 
AND GM (2009).  Later, in 2009, the government would provide additional funding to 
General Motors and Chrysler through unorthodox and controversial bankruptcy 
proceedings.  Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing The Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 727, 728 (2010).  
56  The phrase “creative destruction” is associated with the Austrian economist 
Joseph Schumpeter and his most famous work, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY (1942).  
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however, destruction is often just destructive.  Few today would heed the 
economic recovery plan that Herbert Hoover attributed to Andrew Mellon:  
 
“Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, 
liquidate real estate.”  [Mellon] insisted that, when the people 
get an inflation brainstorm, the only way to get it out of their 
blood is to let it collapse.  He held that even a panic was not 
altogether a bad thing.  He said: “It will purge the rottenness 
out of the system.  High costs of living and high living will 
come down.  People will work harder, live a more moral life.  
Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up 
the wrecks from less competent people.”57  
 
As described above, bank and financial failures are particularly disruptive 
to the larger economy.  
1. Bank Activities 
 
Governments have long regulated the types of activities that banks can 
undertake.  The Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act58 divorced commercial 
banking (i.e., taking customer deposits) from investment banking (i.e., acting 
as broker, dealer or underwriter for securities) but had been repealed by the 
end of the twentieth century.59  Glass-Steagall had several rationales, one of 
which was to protect the banking system from the risks inherent in the stock 
                                                 
57  HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION, 1929-1941 (1952).  
58  The U.S. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 
162, 184–85, 188–89, 194 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.). 
59  The Glass-Steagall provisions were sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking 
Act of 1933.  See Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the 
Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 1 n.1 (1987).  
Sections 16 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012)) and 21 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2012)) remain in force, preventing the same corporate 
entity from acting as both investment and commercial bank.  Sections 20 and 32 
prevented investment and commercial banks from coming under common control 
(either by corporate structure or by interlocking directors, officers, or employees).  
These provisions were formally repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 103, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999), although prior 
regulatory and judicial interpretations had largely eviscerated them.  See Jonathan R. 
Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 691, 691–92 (2000).  




market.60  Today, banks that accept deposits cannot directly engage in 
investment banking, but they can indirectly do so via non-bank affiliates.  
The Dodd-Frank Act’s “Volcker rule,”61 attempts to create a similar divide 
between regulated banks and securities dealing by prohibiting banks from 
engaging in proprietary trading on their own account (rather than for clients).62  
The Volcker rule is a high-profile slice of Dodd-Frank, which dramatically 
expands the authority of financial regulators, especially over the large bank 
holding companies that now dominate American finance.63  Like Glass-
Steagall, the Volcker rule regulates the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet.  
Because volatile assets are more likely to send a bank into insolvency than 
placid ones, governments try to direct banks into less investment.  
2. Capital Adequacy 
 
Firm investments determine the amount of losses a firm might face.  Banks 
might suffer losses differently by investing in the stock market, mortgages, or 
CDOs.  Firm capital structure, however, determines how much loss a firm can 
absorb before being distressed or insolvent.  A firm funded 100% with 
common equity could not become insolvent, whereas a firm funded 100% with 
debt becomes insolvent with the slightest loss.  As financial intermediaries, 
banks naturally hold debt in their capital structure in the form of demand 
deposits and other short-term obligations like repo.  
To reduce the risk of distress or insolvency, regulators require banks to 
hold a certain level of common equity and other “capital” on their balance 
sheets.  The actual rules for bank capital are incredibly complex64 but present 
                                                 
60  See Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630–31 (1971).  
61  The Volcker rule is named after former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker 
who advocated for the rule.  See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 1–2 (2010). 
62  See Dodd-Frank § 619(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012)); see 
also id. § 619(h)(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4) (2012)) (defining proprietary 
trading).  The prohibition applies to a “banking entity,” which includes a depository 
institution, its parent company, and affiliates.  See id. § 619(h)(1) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1) (2012)).  
63  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 114(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(1) (2012)) 
(authorizing additional regulation for “large, interconnected bank holding 
companies”). 
64  See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A 
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING 
SYSTEMS (2010, rev. 2011) [hereinafter BASEL III, CAPITAL] 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPQ8-496W]; BASEL 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
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fairly straightforward issues.  Regulators must define what qualifies as capital 
and specify the amount a bank must carry.  Common equity clearly qualifies, 
and senior secured debt does not.  Firms also finance with instruments having 
characteristics of both debt and equity, like preferred stock and unsecured 
debentures.  
Capital structure alone, however, does not determine the risk of a default.  
We must also know about the riskiness of the firm’s business.  A firm with a 
1-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio looks to have a safe capital structure, but if it is 
pursuing a very risky business strategy, it could still face a high risk of default.  
Similarly, a firm with a 9-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio might pursue a very safe, 
low-risk business strategy that makes default unlikely.  Thus, regulators need 
a way to link the riskiness of the firm’s capital structure to the riskiness of its 
activities.  A series of agreements among central bankers from the developed 
world, known as the Basel accords, provide regulators with a road map for 
regulating bank capital.65  
The basic model of Basel is to require firms to have a certain amount of 
“capital” in their financial structure; the amount is determined as a percentage 
of “risk-weighted assets.”  Under the current and prior accords, Basel I and II, 
the requirement is that total capital equal at least 8% of risk-weighted assets.66  
Conceptually, capital is a structure that the Basel committee believed could 
absorb losses, perhaps thought of as financial shock absorbers.  The accords 
divide capital into “tier 1” and “tier 2.”  The main component of tier 1 capital 
is common equity, although certain types of preferred stock and disclosed 
accounting reserves count as well.67  At least half of required capital must 
come from tier 1.68  The remainder may come from tier 2, a less restrictive set 
including preferred stock and accounting provisions and reserves excluded 
from tier 2.69 
The true complexity of Basel comes from determining a firm’s “risk-
weighted assets.” Different assets held by a firm receive different weight, 
depending on the asset, the accord (Basel I or II), and the methodology 
authorized by the accord.  The following stylized example will hopefully 
convey the gist of the Basel approach.  A very low-risk asset (like government 
bonds) might receive a 0% weight.  As a result, a firm need not hold any capital 
                                                 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK COMPREHENSIVE 
VERSION (2006) [hereinafter BASEL II] http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DH3U-2W77]. 
65  See BASEL III, CAPITAL, supra note 64; BASEL II, supra note 64; see also BASEL 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988) [hereinafter BASEL I].  
66  BASEL II, supra note 64, at 12; BASEL I, supra note 65, at 14.  
67  See BASEL III, CAPITAL, supra note 64 at 13.  
68  See supra note 66.  
69  See BASEL II, supra note 64, at 14–18. 




against the bond.  Riskier assets are assigned higher weights, up to and even 
exceeding 100%.  To use a simple example, a firm might hold two assets, both 
with a value of $500 million, but one with a risk-weighting of 0% and the other 
with a risk-weighting of 100%.  The firm would then have total risk-weighted 
assets of $500 million, against which the firm would need to hold capital of 
8%, or $40 million.  At least half, or $20 million, would need to come from 
tier 1 capital.  
Basel is an unusually successful example of cooperative international law.  
The Basel Committee itself has no formal power, and the Basel accords are 
not binding as treaties.  Still, countries over the world have adopted some 
version of Basel.  Basel has not, however, been so brilliant in the intended goal 
of controlling systemic risk.70  All of the large investment and commercial 
banks in the United States were subject to some version of Basel in 2008.71  
Moreover, the United States imposed an additional “leverage ratio” on its 
commercial (but not investment banks), requiring them to holding at least 5% 
of tier 1 capital against total assets.72  This rule is simpler than Basel II, in that 
assets are not weighted for risk.  
In response to the financial crisis, the Basel committee agreed on a new 
accord, “Basel III,” in September 2010.73  Basel III has yet to be implemented 
in the U.S., but will force banks to hold more tier 1 capital and common equity.  
Common equity must be at least 4.5%, and tier 1 capital 6.0%, of risk-weighted 
assets.74  Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) must hold even 
more.  Basel III also advances the concept of macro-prudential regulation by 
requiring banks to increase their capital when credit markets are expanding.75  
3. Deposit Insurance 
Federal deposit insurance not only protects depositors but also removes 
their incentive to panic and make a run on their bank.  Before the financial 
                                                 
70  See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE BASEL COMMITTEE’S 
RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: REPORT TO THE G-20 10 (2010), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs179.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UDV-D5RF] .  
71  DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANQUE DE FRANCE CONFERENCE, CAPITAL 
REGULATION ACROSS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 8 (2015) (“Prior to the crisis, the 
Basel regime—though nominally applicable only to internationally active banks—in 
fact applied to most banks in many member jurisdictions, including the United States 
and the European Union (EU).”).  
72  See 12 C.F.R. § 325.103(b) (2017). 
73  See BASEL III, CAPITAL, supra note 64.  
74  Id. at 12.  
75  See id. at 59.  
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crisis, the FDIC protected account values up to $100,000.76  In order to calm 
depositors and prevent bank runs, the government increased this protection to 
$250,000.77  The Treasury department even temporarily guaranteed money-
market mutual funds,78 the supposedly uninsured mutual funds that invest in 
repo and other short-term corporate obligations.79  
The FDIC charges premiums for its deposit insurance in order to offset 
amounts it must pay out.80  Protecting depositors, though, comes at a cost 
beyond directly covering their losses.  Depositors do not monitor their banks 
to make sure they are conducting their business prudently.  As a result, bank 
managers and shareholders may be tempted to pursue risky projects that have 
a large potential gain, even if potential losses make those projects imprudent 
overall.  The incentive to pursue risk is known as “moral hazard,” which is 
thought to be the primary cost of deposit insurance and bailouts.81       
4. Discount Window and Other Lending Facilities 
Banks face the risk of illiquidity because they borrow short-term funds 
(e.g., deposits, repo) and invest in long-term projects (e.g., Mrs. Macklin’s 
mortgage, structured finance projects).  Thus, a perfectly solvent bank may not 
have enough liquid funds to discharge its liabilities.  Through its discount 
window, the Federal Reserve (Fed) system acts as lender-of-last-resort and 
makes short-term loans to banks facing liquidity strains.82   
During the crisis, many banks feared they would be stigmatized by 
borrowing from the discount window, perversely making the discount window 
a destabilizing force.83  In December 2007, the Fed responded to this concern 
                                                 
76  Cf. Dodd-Frank § 335(a), 124 Stat. at 1540 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
1821(a)(1)(E)(2012)) (replacing $100,000 limit with $250,000).  
77  See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E).  The FDIC fully insures non-interest-bearing 
accounts through December 31, 2012.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) 
(amended by Dodd-Frank § 343(a), 124 Stat. at 1544).  
78  See U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 
TREASURY’S TEMPORARY GUARANTEE PROGRAM FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS 
(2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1163.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3ELW-QVFZ]. 
79  Cf. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 31 (discussing the “run on repo”). 
80  See Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 226. 
81  See, e.g., id. at 209.  
82  See THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 44–45 (9th ed. 
2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TYM2-QHDK].  
83  Before Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve did not publish the identity of 
discount-window borrowers, although it did publish the volume of borrowing.  
Nevertheless, banks feared that others could detect their discount-window borrowing 
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by creating the Term Auction Facility (TAF), which came to dwarf the 
discount window during the crisis.84  Because TAF used a competitive bidding 
process, banks perceived it as carrying less stigma than the discount window.85 
TAF was open only to depository institutions.86  In order to supply 
liquidity to other financial institutions, the Fed created a wide array of 
extraordinary lending facilities and guarantee programs.87  In December 2010, 
the Fed revealed the details of many of these transactions, identifying 
participants ranging from Goldman Sachs to Harley Davidson.88  
5. Bailouts
Afraid that default would further destabilize the financial system, the U.S. 
government deployed massive funds to keep bank creditors whole, while 
letting shareholders suffer, to curtail moral hazard.  When the New York Fed 
brokered a deal for JPMorgan to buy Bear Stearns, government officials 
initially urged a lower price than JPMorgan was willing to pay.89  And, when 
it put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in government conservatorship, it largely 
squeezed out the interests of their shareholders (including Ralph Nader, who 
has taken his grievances to the readership of the Wall Street Journal).90  
by analyzing private borrowing patterns and the published volume of borrowing.  See 
Renee Courtois Haltom, Stigma and the Discount Window, REGION FOCUS:
RICHMOND FED. RES., First Quarter 2011, at 6. 
84  See id. at 7–8. 
85  Indeed, banks paid higher rates using TAF than they could at the discount 
window.  See id. at 8; see also Olivier Armantier et al., The Federal Reserve’s Term 
Auction Facility, 14 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.: CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. AND FIN., no.
5, 2008, at 6 (describing the decreased stigma from auction borrowing).   
86  See Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 72 FED. REG. 71,202, 
71,202 (Dec. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 201) (“TAF will be made only 
to depository institutions that are in generally sound financial condition, are expected 
to remain in that condition during the term of the advance and are eligible to receive 
advances under section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act.”).  
87  The legal authorization for these facilities comes from section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)).  See also BAIRD WEBEL & 
MARC LABONTE, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL 
TURMOIL 16 (2010). 
88  See David Reilly & Rolfe Winkler, Moral Hazard, Thy Price Is $3.3 Trillion, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2010. 
89  Kate Kelly, Bear Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Days, WALL
ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A14. 
90  See Ralph Nader, The Great Fannie and Freddie Rip-Off, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 
2011. 
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Early on, the government’s assistance was ad hoc, as with the Bear Stearns 
deal.  As the financial crisis intensified, it became clear that many firms would 
fold without direct assistance.  The government started an array of ambitious 
programs to prop up failing banks, the most famous of which is the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP), created by Congress in October 2008.91  The 
Treasury Department used its TARP funding and authority to buy roughly 
$200 billion of preferred stock in banks and other companies, most of which 
has been repaid.92   
Even though bailouts largely protected bank creditors, not all remained 
intact.  In another government-brokered acquisition, JPMorgan bought the 
assets of failed thrift Washington Mutual, subject to the claims of its depositors 
and general creditors.93  It did not, however, assume any obligations to 
Washington Mutual’s equity and subordinated debt holders, who were wiped 
out in the deal.94  Similarly, creditors of Lehman Brothers were left to fend for 
themselves in bankruptcy.95  Nevertheless, most creditors of failed banks 
survived unimpaired thanks to government bailouts.  As Professor David Skeel 
notes, “[t]he bailouts of 2008 were creditor bailouts.”96  
II. TAXING SYSTEMIC RISK 
A.   Introduction 
 
This Article focuses on financial taxes as a regulatory measure imposed to 
improve the behavior of financial firms.  Some might argue that financial-
sector taxes could be useful for other purposes, like retribution for harm caused 
during the financial crisis or diminution of an overly large and powerful 
financial sector.97  Even if these goals are valid, they may have already been 
achieved.  As a recent magazine article puts it, “[a]fter surprisingly successful 
financial reform, public vilification, and politics that have turned against them, 
                                                 
91  See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3767-3800.  
92  See WEBEL & LABONTE, supra note 87, at 8.  
93  See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in 
Bankruptcy 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 1034 (2010). 
94  See id.  
95  See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011). 
96  Id. at 147. 
97  See Shackelford et al., supra note 7, at 781.  




the Masters of the Universe are masters no longer.”98  In any event, this Article 
does not consider these non-regulatory goals in any detail.  
B.   The Pigouvian Tradition 
Taxing externalities is an old idea, usually attributed to economist A.C. 
Pigou’s 1932 work, The Economics of Welfare.99  A modern defense of the 
Pigovian tradition comes from economist Greg Mankiw, who writes:  
 
For at least two reasons, Pigovian taxes are popular among 
economists.  First, they are often the least invasive way to 
remedy a market failure.  They can restore an efficient 
allocation of resources without requiring a heavy-handed 
government intervention into the specific decisions made by 
households and firms.  Second, they raise revenue that the 
government can use to reduce other taxes, such as income 
taxes, which distort incentives and cause deadweight 
losses.100 
 
Environmental taxes (e.g., carbon or gasoline taxes) are favorites of 
Mankiw and his “Pigou Club.”  Some commentators resist environmental 
taxes because they are regressive.101  A gasoline tax does not distinguish 
between wealthy and poor drivers.  Regardless of the merits of this resistance, 
it has no obvious application to a corrective tax on the financial sector.  If 
anything, such a tax would be progressive, falling mainly on bankers and 
owners of capital.   
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell elaborate on the general superiority of 
corrective taxes to regulation.  They write, “[t]he reason that the corrective tax 
is superior to quantity regulation is evident.  The corrective tax effectively 
harnesses the firm’s information about its control costs.”102  Kaplow and 
Shavell show that a Pigovian tax works even if the government does not know 
the magnitude of harms caused by an externality.  Without this knowledge, the 
                                                 
98  Gabriel Sherman, Is This the End of Wall Street As They Knew It?, N.Y. MAG. 
(Feb. 5, 2012), http://nymag.com/news/features/wall-street-2012-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/5MYG-8QRU]. 
99  ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183 (4th ed. 1932). 
100  N. Gregory Mankiw, Smart Taxes: An Open Invitation to Join the Pigou Club, 
35 E. ECON. J. 14, 16 (2009), 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/smart_taxes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V5J4-U4FZ ]. 
101  Id. at 22. 
102  Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to 
Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2002).  
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government could not set the tax rate at its optimal level, which equals the 
marginal cost of harms caused.  Nevertheless, the tax can still limit the amount 
of externalities (e.g., the amount of carbon output).  Even under uncertainty 
about harms, the tax serves the same function as direct regulation (limiting the 
externality), only more efficiently (by harnessing producers’ information 
about their own costs).   
These arguments, coming from the strongest supporters of corrective 
taxation, direct the inquiry for the rest of this Article.  As argued earlier in this 
Part, systemic risk is an externality that the government should curtail.  One 
avenue for doing so would be a corrective tax.  Kaplow and Shavell rebut the 
potential complaint that the harms caused by systemic risk are too uncertain 
and speculative to warrant a corrective tax.  Government could still use the tax 
to limit total systemic risk.103   
However, we still have the problem of actually measuring the externality 
that must be curtailed.  Just what should policymakers try to limit?  
Presumably, it is systemic risk, but we need some concrete and numerical 
measurement of systemic risk in order to levy a corrective tax on finance.  As 
this Article proceeds, we will see that these problems present the most serious 
obstacle to policymakers trying to enact a corrective tax on finance.   
C.   Design of a Corrective Tax on the Financial Sector 
1. International Cooperation 
 
Financial regulation is largely international.  The premier regulatory 
framework for controlling systemic risk, the Basel Accords, is the result of 
international cooperation.104  Suppose that the U.S. government effectively 
identifies a marker that strongly correlates with systemic risk and chooses to 
tax it.  Financial firms may pay the tax, but they may simply move their 
operations abroad.  Indeed, the United Kingdom resists a European tax on 
finance for just this reason, fearful that its London-based banks and financial 
firms will simply relocate to New York or elsewhere.105   
A standard critique is that such an exit from markets is a policy failure.106  
Suppose that the United States alone enacted a financial-sector tax and drove 
many of its banks to London or elsewhere.  The United States would lose 
                                                 
103  Id. at 9.  
104  See supra Part I.E.2. 
105  See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
106  See BASEL I, supra note 65, p. 2 (“[Regulation] should be in fair and have a 
high degree of consistency in its application to banks in different countries with a view 
to diminishing an existing source of competitive inequality among international 
banks.”). 




access to capital market.  The exiting firms may still pose a systemic threat to 
the U.S. economy.  Continuing with the pollution analogy, the United States 
does not win if its polluters simply move to the Bahamas.  Moving from 
analogy to recent history, we should note that the recent crisis affected the 
global economy, even though it originated in U.S. financial markets.  Even 
today, the sovereign-debt crisis in Europe threatens U.S. markets.  Ridding 
ourselves of bankers does not rid us of systemic risk.   
International cooperation has been successful in implementing global 
standards on bank capital.107  National regulators meet in Basel, decide on 
policy, and bring their decisions back home for domestication via the 
regulatory process.  It is impossible to imagine this cooperative model 
producing a new tax in the United States. anytime soon.  Regulators cannot 
adopt taxes via notice and comment the way they adopt Basel.   
2. Not Taxing Bad Outcomes 
 
Corrective taxes are usually straightforward.  If we want less of 
something—say pollution—we tax it.  This simple logic does not apply to bank 
failures.  We may want fewer banks to fail, but we can hardly tax them when 
they do.  Indeed, the government is unlikely to let a major bank fail anytime 
soon after the wreckage believed to have been caused by the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008.  
Similarly, corrective taxes should not apply at times of distress, when 
failure seems particularly likely.  The politics, economics, and regulation of 
banks are already “procyclical” in that a banking crisis feeds on itself.  As 
discussed above, the failure of one destabilizes the balance sheet of other banks 
and the confidence of their depositors.108  Regulation can reinforce the vortex 
of failure. Faltering banks must sell assets in order to meet capital 
requirements,109 but doing so only destabilizes markets even more.  Increasing 
the burdens on financial firms during distress would counter the goal of 
financial stability.   
3. Not Imposing Higher Income Taxes 
 
As taxing failure is not an option, higher income taxes on banks might 
seem promising.  After all, income taxes are premised on the idea of burdening 
winners by taxing them and assisting losers by granting them deductions.110  A 
                                                 
107  See supra Part I.E.2. 
108  See supra Part I.C. 
109  See supra Part I.D. 
110  See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal 
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1440 (2006) 
(noting “morally relevant difference between winners and losers”).  
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close examination of the income tax, though, will show that it fails as a 
corrective tax on finance.  Suppose that, in a tax-free world, an investment 
bank IB would want enter into a derivatives contract with a counterparty CP 
under the following terms:  
 
• If gold hits some preestablished benchmark next year, IB 
receives $100 from CP.  
 
• If gold does not hit the benchmark, IB pays $100 to CP.   
Let us assume that the benchmark is set so that the contract is “fair” (i.e., 
it has no ex-ante value to either side).  Even though it has no expected value, 
the contract does impose risk, in that possible outcomes are dispersed.111  Each 
party will either win or lose $100, giving the possible outcomes a spread of 
$200.   
An income tax reduces this spread.  A 50% income tax lowers the winner’s 
after-tax gain to $50.  But, if the government grants a deduction to the loser, 
the loser may suffer an after-tax harm of only $50.  The 50% tax cuts the after-
tax spread in half, from $200 to $100.  More generally, we can say that the 
50% tax cuts in half the investment risk.  So far, the income tax looks like a 
plausible corrective tax as it seems to reduce risk.  
Nevertheless, the parties can easily undo this risk reduction.  In a tax-free 
world, they would structure their bet to achieve a spread of $200.  Under a 
50% tax, they achieve this desired result simply by doubling the risky bet as 
                                                 
111  By granting a deduction worth 50% of losses, the tax system is “symmetric.”  
The full loss offset condition requires that the tax system be symmetrical with respect 
to gains and losses.  See Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns 
to Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879 (2006).  The 
example and adjustments described above come from the “taxation of risk” literature 
which aims to address risk taking of all types of taxpayers.  Arguably, individuals do 
not have the sophistication or access to capital needed to make the adjustments 
contemplated by this literature.  See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with 
a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 431–32 (2000).  Clearly, this criticism has no force 
against investment banks.  A more potent criticism focuses on the assumption that the 
income tax treats gains and losses symmetrically.  In our example, IB and the 
government share equally in the gains and losses.  However, the U.S. corporate tax 
does not always treat gains and losses symmetrically.  Corporations may or may not 
be able to deduct capital losses immediately, depending on whether they have 
offsetting capital gains.  See I.R.C. § 1211 (2012).  They may or may not receive an 
immediate tax benefit for ending a taxable year with an overall loss, depending on 
profitability in prior years.  See I.R.C. § 172 (2012).  These limits are haphazard from 
a financial perspective, as they depend on a corporation’s tax attributes, which have 
little bearing on systemic risk. 




follows:   
 
• If gold hits the benchmark, IB $200 receives before tax. After 
paying tax on the income, IB gains $100.  
 
• If gold does not hit the benchmark, IB pays CP $200. After 
deducting the loss, IB loses $100.  
 
Imposing the 50% tax does not change the after-tax results.  IB easily 
undoes the risk reduction coming from the income tax.  With or without the 
tax, it faces the same $200 spread between winning as losing.112   
At best then, higher taxes seem not to alter the firm’s overall riskiness.  
One might even argue that the income tax makes systemic risk worse.  In our 
example, the income tax caused IB to double the size of its risky wager.  
Ultimately, IB’s after-tax results do not change.  If IB loses the bet, its $200 
loss imposes only $100 of after-tax harm.  The income tax does, however, 
result in larger pre-tax losses.  Market observers might become panicked by 
observing the larger losses without considering their tax benefits.  As noted 
before,113 perceptions do matter to the stability of financial firms.  By 
encouraging more before-tax risk taking, a higher income-tax rate might make 
perceptions worse.   
The example so far has focused on taxes and the riskiness of firm assets.  
Taxes already distort the capital structure of incorporated firms, at least in that 
U.S. corporations may deduct interest payments114 but not dividends.  Thus, 
U.S. corporations have a tax incentive to finance their operations with debt 
rather than equity.115  Higher income taxes on corporations—the near universal 
form of large financial firms—would provide them an incentive to fund with 
even more debt, further threatening financial stability.116   
                                                 
112  Financial markets usually measure investment risk in terms of standard 
deviation or the dispersion of possible returns.  See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing 
Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 521, 573 (2009) (“The 
key measure of risk is standard deviation.”).  
113  See supra Part I.C.  
114  See I.R.C. §163 (2012). 
115  Several countries attempt to “integrate” the taxation of corporations and 
shareholders, aiming to achieve a single level of tax.  See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., 
TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 120 (3d ed. 2009).  
116  But cf. William Poole, Moral Hazard: The Long-Lasting Legacy of Bailouts, 65 
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 17, 22 (Nov./Dec. 2009) (proposing to deny interest deductions for 
financial firms).  
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4. Taxing Factors Associated with Bad Outcomes 
Let us continue with the prior example and ask why IB wants to bet on the 
price of gold in the first place.  We can identify three plausible motives:  
 
• Hedging: IB is hedging against some exposure it faces 
elsewhere.  For example, IB might simply be offsetting another 
gold contract demanded by a customer.  The contract with CP 
reduces its overall risk.  This motivation is clearly allowed.  
 
•  “Alpha” Hunting: IB is capitalizing on some particular 
knowledge or expertise about what the future holds for the price 
of gold.  In financial jargon, alpha is the portion of investment 
returns derived from acumen or research.  According to 
proponents of market efficiency, alpha does not exist.117  
Bankers and high-profile investors invariably claim that it 
does.118   
 
• “Volatility” Hunting: Bankers at IB are simply gambling.  In 
financial jargon, volatility is risk, which requires no acumen to 
assume.119  If gold goes up, the bankers pay themselves 
handsomely.  If gold goes down, they shrug it off and try again 
next year.  To make the example more extreme, suppose they bet 
$10 billion on gold contracts.  If gold goes up, the bankers 
receive a huge bonus that sets them up for life.  If gold goes 
down, the bankers get fired but face no other repercussions, even 
if they trigger insolvency or a systemic crisis.   
 
Clearly, the hedging motivation is benign, even beneficial, to systemic 
risk.  Volatility hunting clearly harms the financial system.  Alpha has less 
clear effects.  If IB has superior knowledge and can capitalize on it with little 
or no risk, financial regulators should have no qualms.  We should, however, 
be concerned that bankers at IB are deluding themselves about their abilities, 
                                                 
117  See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 230 (rev. 
ed. 2003).  
118  Cf. Martin L. Liebowitz, Alpha Hunters and Beta Grazers, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS 
J., 32, 33 (Sept./Oct. 2005) (discussing attributes of highly successful investors like 
Warren Buffett).  
119  Cf. id. at 39 n.1 (“The great mass of investors should treat the market as being 
highly efficient and should start with the null hypothesis that all assets are fairly 
priced.”).  




claiming that they are seeking alpha but in reality seeking volatility.  There 
may be intermediate cases of concern as well.  Perhaps IB does have superior 
knowledge about the likely price of gold next but cannot capitalize on it 
without exposing itself to some significant risk of failure.   
The Volcker rule outlaws most forms of “proprietary trading” financial 
firms that accept insured deposits120 (most systemically important financial 
firms in the U.S. accept deposits).121  Conceptually, the Volcker rule tries to 
banish both alpha and volatility hunting.  It continues to allow for hedging and 
other activities perceived to be less risky.  Regulators face a massive challenge, 
however, in implementing this rule.  The categories given above seem clear 
cut, but in reality they are not.  Regulators must draft rules that identify 
particular transactions as falling within allowed or prohibited categories.122  
Drafting efforts to date have proven to be extraordinarily complex123 and 
controversial (at least when compared to other forms of financial 
regulation).124 
Perhaps tax can act as the sieve.  Firms that do particularly well may 
simply be taking on a lot of risk via proprietary trading (i.e., alpha and 
                                                 
120 See Nathaniel Popper, Regulators Weigh Public Input on ‘Volcker Rule’, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/15/business/la-fi-volcker-
rule-20120215 [https://perma.cc/X2L4-G5FZ]. 
121  “Systemic importance” is, of course, in the eye of the beholder.  To date, the 
most consequential designation as such has come from the Financial Stability Board.  
The FSB designated eight U.S. firms as such: Bank of America; Bank of New York 
Mellon; Citigroup; Goldman Sachs Group; JP Morgan Chase; Morgan Stanley; State 
Street; and Wells Fargo.  See Fin. Stability Bd., Policy Measures to Address 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions  (Nov. 4 2011), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MH9U-J9R7].  All of them are “bank holding companies” that 
include depository institutions within their corporate families.  See HOLDING 
COMPANIES WITH ASSETS GREATER THAN $10 BILLION, 
https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/HCSGreaterThan10B.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/S9XW-SGPG](last visited Oct. 10, 2017) (listing the top 50 bank 
holding companies).  
122  See generally Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 68,846 (Nov. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 351). 
123  Davis Polk is likely the leading private law firm dealing with Dodd-Frank 
implementation.  Its “summary” version of the Volcker Rule’s prohibition on 
proprietary trading runs 20 pages and reads more like an electrical schematic than a 
legal document.  Cf. Summary of the Volker Rule Study – Proprietary Trading, (Jan. 
19, 2011), https://www.davispolk.com/publications/summary-volcker-rule-study-–-
proprietary-trading/ [https://perma.cc/HQW6-ANZ6] (summarizing Volcker Rule). 
124  Popper, supra note 120.  
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volatility hunting).  If that is the case, then good performance in one year may 
well predict a bad result in later years.  Thus, corrective tax on particularly 
good outcomes might curtail systemic risk.   
This idea faces two obstacles.  First, we would need to be convinced that 
particularly good performance is strongly correlated with something we want 
to curtail.  Second, even if we could make that case, we would need to define 
a tax that defines particularly good performance.  The financial activities tax, 
advocated by the IMF, is a plausible candidate for such a tax.125  The 
theoretical case for this and similar taxes on “success” is discussed below.126   
The government may also seek markers of systemic risk other than 
particularly good financial results.  Two candidates discussed below are taxing 
leverage127 and taxing financial transactions.128  Each of these has a plausible 
connection to systemic risk.  Leverage reduces the ability of a firm to absorb 
losses before it is thrown into insolvency.  Frequent trading might be 
associated with alpha and volatility hunting.  Moreover, many financial firms 
rely heavily on short-term debt-like repurchase agreements (repo) that must be 
renewed frequently.  Repo is an unstable source of financing that can disappear 
during a panic.  A financial transactions tax would apply every time a firm 
renews repo lending (potentially daily) and could encourage financial firms to 
seek out long-term, more stable financing.   
D.   Institutional Considerations of a Corrective Tax on Finance 
Section A began by taking some non-regulatory justifications for a 
financial-sector tax off the table.  Section B offered the “Pigovian” rationale 
for preferring a regulatory tax over direct regulation.  This Section will discuss 
institutional and pragmatic considerations for choosing the balance between 
direct regulation and corrective taxation of the financial sector.   
First, and most powerfully, regulatory efforts may already be effective in 
curtailing systemic risk.  Dodd-Frank in particular is not yet fully 
implemented.  If Dodd-Frank is successful in curtailing systemic risk, then the 
rationale for imposing a corrective tax is significantly diminished.  For 
example, Dodd-Frank authorizes the federal government to shut down and 
resolve troubled financial firms.  The goal of this resolution authority is to 
avoid both government bailouts and complex bankruptcy proceedings.129  
                                                 
125  Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, 
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 
68,846. 
126  See infra Part IV.  
127  See infra Part V. 
128  See infra Part III. 
129  See SKEEL, supra note 95.  




Similarly, Basel III will require banks to hold more capital than they held 
before the financial crisis.   
A well-designed corrective tax may seem superior to regulation for 
institutional reasons.  Recent critics have complained that U.S. financial 
regulators are too cozy and accommodating with their wards.  Matt Taibbi, 
writing for the Rolling Stone, (in)famously called Goldman Sachs “a great 
vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its 
blood funnel into anything that smells like money.”130  According to Taibbi, 
Hank Paulson (former head of Goldman and then Secretary of Treasury during 
most of the crisis) rigged government bailout efforts for the benefit of 
Goldman.131  Paulson let Goldman competitor Lehman Brothers collapse but 
made sure to bail out AIG, which owed Goldman billions of dollars.132  Taibbi 
is not alone in his harsh treatment of both Wall Street and Washington.133   
Regardless of the harsh critics, financial regulation is inherently 
discretionary.  The bailouts of 2008 and 2009 were mainly ad hoc, devised and 
implemented in response to current events.  Even during placid times, financial 
regulation relies on ambiguous concepts like “safety and soundness” which 
entrust discretion to regulators.  Similarly, banks and other interested parties 
are currently lobbying regulators for exemptions from the reach of the Volcker 
Rule and other elements of Dodd-Frank.134   
We should not, however, compare the messy “real world” of financial 
regulation with some idealized system for taxing banks.  Any financial-sector 
tax in the United States. must come from Congress, which currently appears 
incapable of creating sound tax policy.135  Congress regularly uses special 
giveaways in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or Code) to curry favor with 
voters and supporters, and we could expect Congress to do much the same with 
                                                 
130 Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 5, 
2010), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-great-american-bubble-
machine-20100405 [https://perma.cc/B7VN-U2XE]. 
131  Id. 
132  See id. 
133  Cf. INSIDE JOB (Sony Picture Classics 2010) (harshly chronicling role of 
regulators in financial crisis).  
134 Cf. Tom Fairless, Citigroup Wants Foreign Sovereign Debt Exempt From 
Volcker Rule, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 26, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203918304577245263719776348.h
tml [https://perma.cc/LMX6-SPDS] (“Foreign sovereign debt should be exempt from 
a proposed U.S. ban on proprietary trading, Citigroup Inc.’s head of global consumer 
banking said Saturday.”). 
135  See generally Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci 
Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1172–73 (2006) 
(describing rent-seeking and rent extraction in the tax legislative process). 
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any new system of tax.  For example, a financial transactions tax should apply 
in principle to any financial transaction.  Congress, though, would probably 
seek exemptions for certain transactions (like trading in U.S. government debt) 
and for certain parties (like pension funds).136   
Indeed, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) appears to have bowed to 
political realities following the financial crisis.  In general, when a corporation 
has a net loss for a year, it may carry that loss and deduct that loss against 
income earned in later years.137  Past losses then create a valuable tax asset that 
firms can use in the future.  However, the Code limits the ability of 
corporations to deduct such losses following a change in corporate control.138  
The policy rationale is to prevent healthy corporations from acquiring the tax 
losses of other corporations.   
Several bailout recipients, like General Motors, possessed net operating 
losses.  According to the text of the Code, the government bailouts triggered 
the change-in-control limits.  Controversially, the IRS waived any such claim, 
ruling that General Motors and other bailout recipients could continue to use 
their prior losses without limit.139  According to the IRS, imposing the limits 
would be contrary to the policy of the statute and would frustrate the 
government’s attempts to assist the troubled firms.140  Critics, however, claim 
that the IRS was covertly enhancing the bailouts by waiving statutory claims 
to billions of dollars revenue.141  This Article does not take sides on that debate 
but simply notes that IRS was not able to maintain a disinterested neutrality 
toward firms affected by the crisis.  From an institutional perspective, we 
should be skeptical that tax authorities would be more resilient to political or 
industry pressure than financial regulators.   
A corrective tax may also more difficult to change in the future.  Tax cuts 
and tax increases are highly politicized and polarized.  Were Congress to adopt 
                                                 
136  Cf. Fairless, supra note 134 (describing attempts at exemptions from the 
Volcker Rule). 
137  See I.R.C. § 172.  
138  See I.R.C. § 382 (2012).  
139  See Shamik Trivedi, Media Renews Criticism of Treasury NOL Guidance, 134 
TAX NOTES 1210 (Mar. 5, 2012). 
140 See Emily McMahon, Just the Facts: Government Investments in Private 
Companies, the Tax Code and Taxpayers’ Interests, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY: 




141 See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt its Own 
Companies from Tax?: The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward (Harvard L. & Econ. 
Discussion Paper No. 690, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1873429 
[https://perma.cc/4BPP-CWA5]. 




a tax on financial transactions in 2012, it would likely become a permanent 
fixture even if we later determine that the tax does nothing to curtail systemic 
risk.  The revenue would become part of the budget, and Congress would need 
to pay for its loss.  In short, Congress would have difficulty fixing a failed 
corrective tax on finance.  Financial regulators, in contrast, have more 
flexibility in adapting to changing times, as evidenced by the rapid pace of 
developments following the financial crisis (in particular Dodd-Frank and 
Basel III).   
III. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TAX 
A.   Introduction 
 
To date, the most politically viable form of financial-sector taxation has 
been the financial transaction tax, particularly in continental Europe as 
discussed in the next Section.  In the United States, though, a new federal tax 
of any sort is a non-starter for the Republican Party.  A few Democrats 
supported the financial transaction tax, but the Obama Administration did not, 
preferring instead a milder fee assessed on the liabilities of financial 
institutions rather than on their transactions.142  The EU tax, if enacted in the 
United States, would produce annual revenue of perhaps $70 billion.143  In 
contrast, the Obama fee would produce about $6 billion per year and would 
presumptively expire after 10 years.144   
                                                 
142 See Daniel Pruzin & Rick Mitchell, Tax Policy: At G-20 Summit, Obama Pushes 
Risk ‘Contribution' Over Financial Transaction Tax, 97 BANKING REP. (BNA) 831 
(Nov. 8, 2011); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES 23 (Feb. 2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2012-
BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLK8-MMSK]. 
143 European Commission Press Release MEMO/11/640, Common Rules for a 
Financial Transaction Tax – Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 28, 2011), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/640 
[https://perma.cc/Z3VL-Q5MZ] (“At a rate of 0.1% for bonds and shares and 0.01% 
for other kinds of transactions such as derivatives, the [EU] tax could raise 
approximately € 57 billion per year.”).  The EU’s economy is about € 12.6 trillion, 
suggesting that the tax could raise revenue of around 0.45% of 2011 GDP.  The U.S. 
2011 GDP was $15.09 trillion, implying comparable revenue of $68 billion.  
144 See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET 
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES 26 (Feb. 2012), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-
BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2013-BUD.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7KL-9GGL] 
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Despite sturdy political obstacles in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, the financial-transactions tax has potent support, from George Soros 
to Pope Benedict.145  Occupy Wall Street, often criticized for its lack of a 
specific agenda,146 does seem to embrace is a “financial transactions tax.”147 
Given its potential for revenue and impact on a despised financial sector, a 
financial transaction may still emerge as politically viable in the United States 
and the EU.  
Keynes suggested such a tax in his General Theory, arguing, “[t]he 
introduction of a substantial Government transfer tax on all transactions might 
prove the most serviceable reform available, with a view to mitigating the 
predominance of speculation over enterprise in the United States.”148 
Despite its Keynesian heritage, the transaction tax is most associated with 
James Tobin’s proposal to stabilize foreign-exchange rates.149  From the end 
of World War II until the early 1970s, currencies exchanged according to rates 
fixed by the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944.150  The U.S. dollar became the 
official reserve currency of the world economy and was fixed relative to gold 
at $35 per ounce.151  Other nations fixed their currencies relative to the 
dollar.152  Bretton Woods collapsed in 1971, when President Nixon abandoned 
the gold standard and allowed the dollar to float relative to gold.153  Shortly 
thereafter, other nations allowed their currencies to float relative to the 
dollar.154  
Tobin proposed his tax in the period following the collapse of Bretton 
Woods.  He largely welcomed floating exchange rates, but was concerned that 
145 See Jason Zweig, Why a Financial-Transaction Tax Could Backfire, WALL ST.
J.: TOTAL RETURN BLOG, (Dec. 13, 2011), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2011/12/13/why-a-financial-transaction-tax-could-
backfire/ [https://perma.cc/N6WB-WVQY]. 
146 Editorial, The Occupation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2011, at A16 (“It had to 
happen.  The Occupy Wall Street movement—with no leaders, no identifiable agenda 
and nothing but time on its hands—is turning violent.”) 
147 Nicholas D. Kristof, The Bankers and the Revolutionaries, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 1, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/opinion/sunday/kristof-the-bankers-and-
the-revolutionaries.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/M7W7-P8D6]. 
148 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT 160 (1936). 




152 Id. at 155. 
153 Id. at 153. 
154 See THE END OF THE BRETON WOODS SYSTEM (1972-81), INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND WEBSITE,  https://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TD8A-UQBG]. 
2017 TAXING SYSTEMIC RISK 33
the efficiency of currency markets threatened economic stability:  
Specifically, the mobility of financial capital limits viable 
differences among national interest rates and thus severely 
restricts the ability of central banks and governments to 
pursue monetary and fiscal policies appropriate to their 
internal economies.  Likewise speculation on exchange rates, 
whether its consequences are vast shifts of official assets and 
debts or large movements of exchange rates themselves, have 
serious and frequently painful real internal economic 
consequences.155  
Tobin’s response was a tax (perhaps 1%) on all conversions of one 
currency for another, including purchases of goods and services from 
abroad.156  Doing so would “throw some sand in the wheels of our excessively 
efficient international money markets.”157  Tobin was no isolationist, favored 
free trade, and preferred a system of greater coordination of fiscal and 
monetary policies among nations.  In a world of individual nation states with 
separate currencies, however, he would “regretfully recommend” a system of 
“greater financial segmentation between nations.”158  
The Tobin tax was designed to slow movement of financial capital from 
one currency to another.  Limited to its original terms, then, the Tobin tax does 
not respond to the recent financial crisis.  No one thinks violent movements of 
currencies across nations caused the crisis.  In broader terms, however, many 
suggest that an overly active and efficient financial sector may have done so. 
Hoping to slow the fast spinning wheels of finance, modern reformers have 
adapted Tobin’s currency-tax proposal to apply to a wide range of financial 
transactions.    
B.   EU Proposed Financial Transaction Tax 
The leading proposal for a financial transactions tax today comes from the 
EU.  In September 2011, the European Commission proposed a Council 
Directive that would establish a financial transaction tax (FTT) across the 
EU.159  This FTT reflects the distinctive political structure of the EU.  The EU 
155 Tobin, supra note 149, at 154. 
156 Id. at 155. 
157 Id. at 154. 
158 Id. at 154–55. 
159 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Financial 
Transaction Tax, at 2, COM (2011) 594 final (Sept. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Proposal]. 
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itself mandates the FTT and sets the basic design of the FTT.160  Individual 
member states (Germany, France, etc.) collect and enforce the tax.161  
Moreover, the revenue produced by the FTT belongs to the member states, not 
the EU itself.162  
France and Germany strongly support the tax, but the United Kingdom 
remains opposed, concerned that the tax would harm London’s financial 
sector.163  Indeed, U.K. opposition to the tax has affected the entire EU 
enterprise, complicating attempts at dealing with Europe’s very current 
banking crisis.  In December 2011, the United Kingdom alone dissented from 
a new EU pact aimed at improving fiscal discipline and saving the euro from 
possible collapse.164  Some of the sticking points for the United Kingdom were 
the tax and other possible harms to London’s financial sector.165  
Undeterred by Anglo-Saxon resistance, France unilaterally implemented 
such a tax in summer 2012, hoping to prompt the rest of the EU to follow.166  
In early 2013, supporters of an EU tax achieved a partial victory.  Eleven of 
the 27 Member States (including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) obtained 
EU authorization to adopt and coordinate their own financial transactions tax 
pursuant to “enhanced cooperation.”167  In short, the 11 adopting states can 
coordinate their taxes via the EU without involving the other 16 states.168  
Originally, the tax was expected to go into effect in 2014,169 but 
                                                 
160 Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, 
at 19, COM (2013) 71 final (Feb. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Implementing Enhanced 
Cooperation]. 
161 Proposal, supra note 159, at 20–21. 
162 See European Commission Memorandum MEMO/13/98, Financial Transaction 
Tax through Enhanced Cooperation: Questions and Answers (Feb. 14, 2013).   
163 Jim Brunsden, EU Financial Transaction Tax Progress Stalls, FIN. TIMES, June 
5, 2016. 
164 Anthony Faiola, European Union Leaders Agree to Forge New Fiscal Pact; 





165 See Polly Curtis, Will David Cameron's Veto Protect the City?, THE GUARDIAN: 
POLITICS BLOG (Dec. 12, 2011, 8:21 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/reality-
check-with-polly-curtis/2011/dec/12/debt-crisis-conservatives 
[https://perma.cc/HVL8-78A8]. 
166 See French Assembly Adopts Budget With Tax Hikes for Transactions, Banks’ 
Systemic Risk, 99 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 14, at 180–81 (July 24, 2012).   
167 Implementing Enhanced Cooperation, supra note 160, at 3.  
168 See European Commission Memorandum, supra note 162. 
169 Proposal, supra note 159, at 23. 




implementation has been repeatedly postponed because of disagreements 
among the member states.  
The tax is levied on any “financial transaction,” defined as a transaction 
involving any financial instrument.  In a curious omission, the EU excludes 
from the FTT the conversion of one currency for another.  The very transaction 
targeted by the original Tobin tax is exempted by the FTT.   
The EU identifies the obvious rationales behind the FTT.  First and 
foremost, it would produce revenue.  Seeking revenue from financial firms is 
justified in that they caused or contributed to the financial crisis and resulting 
expense and hardships.  More subtly, the EU defends the proposition that it 
(rather than individual member states) should mandate the tax.170  The EU 
hopes to maintain a level playing field across member states and to avoid what 
it calls “fragmentation.”171  Thus, coordinated action is required.  The EU gives 
a nod to the regulatory aspirations of financial sector taxes.  Without 
elaboration, the EU claims it expects the FTT to achieve “financial stability” 
and “to create appropriate disincentives for overly risky transactions and to 
complement regulatory measures.”172  Clearly with its eyes on the United 
States, the EU maintains that “a coordinated approach at international level is 
the best option” and that its proposals “should pave the way towards a 
coordinated approach with the most relevant international partners.”173  Like 
the first commandment given to Moses,174 the EU instructs the member states 
to have no other FTTs.175   
The EU proposal is fairly simple in its terms.  If adopted, it would need to 
be implemented by individual member states.176  Member states would charge 
the tax.177  In rough terms, it would work like a sales tax, applying to the face 
amount of any transaction.  The general rate is 0.1% (10 basis points) of the 
amount involved in the transaction.178  So, a €1 billion transaction would 
generate a €1 million tax.  Derivatives contracts, though, often do not involve 
the exchange of money up front but are measured in terms of a “notional 
                                                 
170 Id. at 2–3. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 24.  
173 Id. at 3. 
174 Cf. Exodus 20:3 (“You shall have no other gods before me.”). 
175 Proposal, supra note 159, at 10. 
176 Id. at 23. 
177 Id. at 20. 
178 Id. at 19–20. 
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amount.”179  In the case of derivatives, the tax rate is 0.01% (1 basis point) of 
the notional amount.180  
C.   Possible Advantages 
The FTT does not have an obvious regulatory element.  It applies to all 
financial transactions, whether good, bad or indifferent.  The FTT might 
conceivably curtail systemic failure simply by shrinking the size of the 
financial sector.  Even if such an effect is a good one, the approach could 
hardly be called regulatory.  Moreover, the balance sheet levies, discussed in 
the next Part, would seem better targeted toward overly large financial 
institutions.  
One possible advantage would be to discourage interconnectedness in the 
financial sector.  Financial firms become connected by transacting with each 
other.  For example, American International Group (AIG) posed systemic risk 
during 2008 because it had sold billions of dollars worth of credit default 
swaps (CDS) to other financial institutions.181  Similarly, banks sold off their 
mortgage portfolios by “securitizing” them into CDOs.182  These 
transactions—the most infamous of the financial crisis—are all of a fairly 
long-term duration.  A one-time tax of 0.1% might make them slightly costlier, 
but probably will not discourage them.  The FTT is far more effective at 
curtailing “high frequency trading” in which firms buy and sell assets over the 
course of a few minutes.  The problem during the financial crisis, though, was 
not too much liquidity.  It was too little, when firms holding CDOs and similar 
instruments could not readily sell them.   
The best argument in favor of an FTT is that it would increase the cost of 
short-term borrowing.  Financial firms rely heavily on short-term borrowing 
like repo.183  The FTT should apply every time a firm rolls over its repo 
obligations, often on a daily basis.  Because repo has such a short duration, its 
cost is usually very low.  But, firms funding through repo need to be able to 
179 For example, parties to an interest rate swap would exchange interest payments 
on a notional amount.  One party would pay a fixed 5% rate but receive a variable rate 
(like LIBOR).  A notional amount of $1 million results in fixed payment of $50,000. 
Usually, the notional amount does not trade hands, only interest payments.  See 
generally HULL, supra note 27, at 150. 
180 Implementing Enhanced Cooperation, supra note 160, at 26. 
181 Credit Derivatives: The Great Untangling, ECONOMIST (Nov. 6, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/12552204 [https://perma.cc/5C76-RN8V]. 
182 See HULL, supra note 27, at 547. 
183 Id. at 76 (2012); Gary Groton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the 
Run on Repo 1 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752 [https://perma.cc/S5C7-7YEF]. 
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access the market on a daily basis.  During a panic, repo lenders could simply 
walk away, causing the equivalent of a bank run.  
An FTT at the rate proposed in Europe (0.1%) could destroy overnight 
repo.  If applied over the 252 trading days in year, an FTT would almost make 
overnight repo more expensive than consumer credit cards.184  
D.   Cascading and Conglomeration 
A significant problem, noted by the IMF and others, is that an FTT has a 
cascading effect.  Let us start with a simple, nonfinancial example to see the 
problem clearly.  Suppose that a nation wants to adopt a 5% sales tax, but the 
tax applies to business sales in addition to retail sales.  Suppose further that 
three steps are involved in making kitchen tables.  Someone must obtain the 
wood.  Someone must cut it into boards.  And, someone crafts the boards into 
a table.  If each step costs $300 (including profits), then the table should sell 
for $900.  
Whether each step should be conducted at one table firm or three specialty 
firms should be determined by which arrangement is more efficient.  But, 
imposing a sales tax on business sales artificially distorts that organization of 
production.  If one firm conducts all production, the tax is $45.  But, if separate 
firms do so, the tax “cascades” at each step.  The first step costs $300 for a $15 
tax.  The second step costs $600 for a $30 tax.  And, the final sale costs $900 
for a $45 tax.  The cascading tax thus encourages concentrated production even 
if specialization across multiple firms would be more efficient.  
A similar, but more complicated, phenomenon could occur under an FTT. 
For example, a bank might find it prudent to hedge against certain interest or 
currency fluctuations.  One option would be to enter into a derivatives 
transaction with another firm.  Another would be for the firm to hedge its risks 
directly by creating its own derivatives division or altering its overall portfolio. 
The incentive is the same as it was with the tables.  The firm has an incentive 
to take on more activities itself rather than farming out work to other firms.  
The effects are ambiguous.  By discouraging inter-firm transactions, the 
FTT may make financial institutions less dependent on one another and less 
interconnected.  On the other hand, an FTT may encourage firms to grow in 
size, making financial distress at one firm more disruptive to the overall system 
and economy.   
184 Assume that the repo rate is otherwise 0% and that the repo transaction is for 1 
million euros.  A daily FTT of 0.1%, compounded over 252 days, forces the borrower 
to repay 1.286 million euros on an annualized basis.  
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IV. FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES TAX
A.   IMF Proposed Financial Activities Tax 
In September 2009, leaders of the G20 met in Pittsburgh to discuss 
recovery from the financial crisis.185  The G20 leaders tasked the IMF with 
preparing a report describing “how the financial sector could make a fair and 
substantial contribution toward paying for any burdens associated with 
government interventions to repair the banking system.”186  The IMF 
responded ten months later, setting out its case for a “financial activities tax” 
(FAT).187  
Obviously, the FAT would produce revenue, which the IMF envisions 
being used for general purposes.188  The IMF suggests a 5% rate189 along with 
three different designs.  The design producing the most revenue would yield 
around $50 billion a year for the United States.190  In the current political 
climate, the FAT is a non-starter in the U.S. Congress.  Few Republicans are 
willing to raise taxes or create new ones.  The financial sector also has natural 
allies in the Democratic party.  Democratic members from New York, New 
Jersey, and Connecticut have historically resisted reforms that would increase 
taxes on finance.191  Even if the U.S. Congress were interested in the FAT, the 
United States would probably need to enact one unilaterally.  Europe, at 
present, is focusing its attention on taxing financial transactions rather than 
financial profits.192  





187 IMF, A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector: Final Report 
for the G-20, at 4–5 (June 2010), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2H4-
QBDC] [hereinafter IMF]. 
188 Id. at 5.  
189 Id. at 22. 
190 Id. at 70 (The IMF suggests three different tax bases.  The largest would capture 
6.6% of U.S. GDP.); see World Bank Data, County Profile: United States (Aug. 2, 
2017), http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states [https://perma.cc/6AUX-
53U5] (U.S. GDP for 2010 is $14.96 trillion.).  
191 See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The Carried Interest 
Controversy: Let's Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAX L. REV. 121, 138 n.80 (2008) 
(discussing Senator Charles Schumer’s opposition to higher taxes on hedge fund and 
private equity managers).  
192 Proposal, supra note 159, at 4. 




The IMF offers the regulatory purpose of curtailing risk taking.193  In broad 
terms, the FAT would apply to both profits and compensation.194  A regulatory 
FAT (dubbed FAT3 by the IMF) would apply only after profits and 
compensation exceeds a certain normal threshold.  The rationale was discussed 
above—good outcomes in a particular year suggest risk taking or gambling, 
which could lead to bad outcomes in later years.195  
B.   The FAT’s Potential Success in Taxing Investment Risk 
1. The Call Option Analogy 
 
The FAT is similar to an option held by the government.  If the firm 
performs well, the government gets paid.  In a sense, it “exercises” the option.  
If the firm does not perform well, the government does not get paid, but loses 
nothing either.  The FAT, by effectively granting the government options on 
the stock of large financial firms, arguably burdens their risk-taking.  To see 
why, suppose that a bank starts with assets of $100 million.  The government 
holds the right, exercisable in one year, to buy 5% of the firm’s assets at their 
current value (i.e., $5 million).  Thus, the government holds a call option over 
assets with a current value of $5 million.   
 
• Suppose the firm doubles the value of its assets over the course 
of the year, growing them to $200 million.  The government 
exercises its right because the assets it can buy (5%) are worth 
more today ($10 million) than their original value ($5 million).  
The net value to the government is the difference, or $5 million. 
  
• Suppose the firm assets fall by 50%. The government does not 
exercise its option because the assets are worth less than their 
original value.   
 
In effect, the option gives the government the right to take 5% of the 
growth of the asset.  But, the government does not share in any losses.  An 
FAT, imposed at a 5% rate, gives the government similar claim.  
                                                 
193 See IMF, supra note 187, at 12.  
194 See id. at 5; Shaviro, supra note 7, at 781. 
195 See supra Part II.C.4. 
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2. Relation between Option Values and Risk
Option theory recognizes the relationship between good outcomes and 
higher risk by assigning higher prices to options on riskier assets.196 
Investment risk refers to the dispersion or variance of possible results.  A bond 
that is sure to grow by 2% is not risky because there is only one outcome (2% 
growth).  Stock that might go up or down 20% in a year is risky.  Stock that 
might go up or down by 50% in a year is even riskier.  Quantitatively, risk is 
measured using standard deviation, a statistical measure of dispersion around 
the average (or mean) return of a particular stock.197   
Higher levels of risk make options more valuable.  Suppose we have two 
assets, both worth $100.  One is sure to grow by 2%.  An option to buy this 
asset for $102 is worthless.  The other might go up or down by 20%.  Clearly, 
an option to buy this asset for $102 has some value.  If the asset goes up, the 
option holder has the right to buy an asset worth $120 for only $102.  Option 
pricing models, like Black-Scholes, provide the value and can illustrate the 
relationship between risk and option value.198  
Before, we saw that the IMF FAT is similar to a government held option. 
For now, let us assume that the FAT is the same as an option over the assets 
of a financial firm.  Now, we will see how the value of the FAT increases as 
the firm invests in riskier assets.  Suppose that the firm, at the beginning of the 
year, holds assets of $100 billion.  The firm chooses how risky it wants to be 
in investing those assets.  It could choose no risk (0%) or very high risk (100%) 
or something in between.  At the end of the year, the government receives 5% 
of the growth of firm assets but does not bear any costs if the assets fall in 
value.  The following graphic shows how the government’s claim, valued ex 
ante, varies depending on the investment risk selected by the firm.  The vertical 
represents the ex-ante value of the FAT.  The horizontal represents the level 
of investment risk, measured in terms of standard deviation.  
196 See HULL, supra note 27, at 7–8. 
197 See HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 459–
64 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2011). 
198 See generally HULL, supra note 27, ch. 14. 
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Clearly, the value of the FAT is nearly linear when related to the level of 
risk selected by the firm.199  Thus, we may think of the FAT (at least as 
modeled above) as imposing a flat rate of tax on risk taking.  
An alternative design, suggested by the IMF, would apply the FAT only 
when profits exceed some hurdle rate of return.200  The hurdle rates are 
intended to capture “excess returns” which might represent rents enjoyed by 
the financial sector or excessive risk seeking.201  The following graph assumes 
that the FAT does not apply until after the firm has a 10% return on assets. 
Thus, the government receives 5% of all profits that exceed $10 billion.  
199 A close approximation is that the option price equals 40% of the current stock 
price times volatility (expressed in standard deviations of return).  
200 IMF, supra note 187, at 68. 
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In the prior graph, the FAT was applied at an essentially flat rate to all 
levels of risk.  In this graph, the FAT largely does not apply until the firm takes 
on a certain level of investment risk.  The graph marks a risk level of 7% as 
the point at which the FAT begins to apply, but it is largely flat after that point. 
3. A Risk-Progressive FAT
The IMF FAT proposals indirectly tax risk at a flat rate.  Adding an 
exemption essentially creates a zero bracket for risk, but the flat structure 
remains.  The marginal social cost of risk taking in finance, however, may not 
be flat.  If a very conservative firm takes on more risk, it may just barely 
increase its risk of failure.  If an aggressive firm takes on more risk, it may 
send it to collapse.  Adding a threshold to the FAT does not capture that 
dynamic.  Instead, the threshold simply adds a zero bracket, after which all 
risk is taxed at virtually the same flat rate.  
Ideally, the FAT would impose a progressive rate of tax on risk.  The rate 
of tax should increase along with the rate of return that the firm earns.  For 
example, the FAT rate could equal half the rate of return that the firm itself 
earns.  This does not mean that the firm shares half of its return with the 
government.  Suppose that the firm described above starts with $100 billion. 
It has a 20% return for the year, earning $20 billion.  Its tax rate would be 10%, 
and it would pay $2 billion under the modified FAT.  If it earned $30 billion 
(a 30% return), its tax rate would be 15%, and it would pay $4.5 billion to the 
government.  
The following graph illustrates how such a progressive FAT would relate 
the burden of the FAT and investment risk undertaken by the firm.  
Thus, the ex-ante burden of the tax accelerates as risk-taking increases.  It 
is not flat as it was under the FAT proposed by the IMF. 
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We should be clear that the burdens imposed by this progressive FAT 
depend not only on the size of profits but also on the rate of return to earn 
them.  A large firm with $100 billion in assets might produce a 2% return or 
$2 billion.  It would pay tax of only 1%.  A smaller firm with only $10 billion 
in assets might produce the same $2 billion.  Since its rate of return is higher 
(20%), it would pay a higher rate, 10% under my suggestion.  This disparity 
would be justified if we think that the smaller firm produced its return by 
taking on more socially harmful risk.  
C.   The FAT’s Failure to Tax Systemic Risk 
To impose the FAT, regulators and legislators would, of course, need to 
identify the taxpayers and the tax base.  The obvious method of identifying 
FAT taxpayers is to identify firms subject to enhanced oversight under Dodd-
Frank.  Bank holding companies with assets over $50 billion make up the bulk 
of this category, which includes virtually all of the name brands in banking 
like Goldman Sachs.202  A handful of non-bank firms (like AIG) will likely 
join them in being subject to Dodd-Frank oversight.203  
Defining the right tax base, though, proves much tougher.  A corrective 
tax on finance must apply to systemic risk, which may well be different from 
the investment risk that the FAT could tax quite effectively.  To see the 
difference, above, I used a hypothetical firm that held $100 billion in assets. 
The FAT quite effectively taxes the risk inherent in the firm’s investments. 
The FAT could even be tweaked to impose progressively greater burdens as 
risk increases.  But, the firm’s systemic threat depends not only on such 
investment risk.  It also turns on the capital structure of the firm.  Compare two 
financial firms, both with $100 billion of assets, and otherwise identical except 
for their capital structures: 
• At EQ Corp., the $100 billion is completely attributable to
shareholder contributions and retained earnings.  So long as EQ
Corp. has no creditors, it cannot become insolvent.  And, if it
cannot become insolvent, it poses no obvious systemic risk to the
202 Victoria MaGrane & Damian Paletta, Regulators Begin Process of Labeling the 
‘Systemically Important’, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487044884045754417236795817
84 [https://perma.cc/RQ5E-M7AE]; see also Dodd-Frank §165(a)(1) (codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)(1)) (explaining that the purpose of the Dodd-Frank statute is 
to mitigate the risk that could arise from the “material financial distress or failure, 
or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected financial institutions . . . Board of 
Governors and bank holding companies with total consolidated assets equal to or 
greater than $50,000,000,000 . . . .”).  
203 Id. 
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financial system. 
• At LEV Corp., the $100 billion is financed with $5 billion of
equity and $95 billion of debt.  If LEV Corp. loses $5 billion, it
will become insolvent and potentially pose a systemic threat to
the financial system.
The FAT, as proposed by the IMF, would quite effectively burden the 
firms for investing the $100 billion in risky ventures.  As a policy matter, 
though, there is no reason to keep EQ Corp. from going wild in risking its 
assets.  It is funded 100% with equity and cannot become insolvent. LEV 
Corp., in contrast, should be restrained because of its narrow margin.  
The FAT, though, fails to distinguish between these firms.  It expressly 
seeks to encourage neutrality in the choice between debt and equity.204  This 
is quite wrongheaded if the FAT is to function as a good regulatory tax, which 
would need to place a much higher burden on LEV Corp.  At a minimum, a 
regulatory tax would need to differentiate between firms based on their 
likelihood of failure.  Clearly, the FAT fails in accomplishing this task.  
This is not to say that FAT model is worthless.  The risk of failure is largely 
determined by two factors: investment risk (which the FAT elegantly captures) 
and leverage (which the FAT treats indifferently than Basel).205  The Basel 
model (discussed previously)206 asks the right questions but failed to prevent 
the recent financial crisis.207  Perhaps Basel should use the FAT model in its 
regulations.  Regulators could (and perhaps should) interpret high profits as a 
mark of high investment risk.  If a leveraged firm like LEV Corp. has high 
profits, it should be forced to increase the amount of equity and other capital 
it has on its books.  A firm like EQ Corp., though, would be left alone because 
it already has abundant capital.   
V. BALANCE SHEET LEVIES 
A.   Introduction 
The discussion of the IMF FAT showed how it failed to reach systemic 
risk.  The FAT may be quite effective at reaching investment risk, or the 
204 See IMF, supra note 187, at 66 (“A key feature of this form of profit taxation is 
that it is neutral with respect to marginal financing and investment decisions.”).  
205 Id. at 68. 
206 See supra Part I.E.2. 
207 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate 
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 1010–11 (2011) (“After 
reviewing a preliminary version of the Basel III proposals, a prominent U.K. financial 
commentator observed, ‘[w]e can say with conviction now that Basel II failed.’”). 
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volatility inherent in a firm’s investment strategy.  It does not, however, 
distinguish between firms that can and cannot handle high levels of risk.  This 
Part discusses the inverse problem.  Now we see proposals that tax the amount 
of debt that firms carry but do not differentiate between firms based on whether 
their debt levels are actually harmful.  
B.   Dodd-Frank’s Near Miss: Financial Crisis Special Assessment 
At the end of June 2010, the U.S. Congress seemed poised to enact a bank 
tax as part of the Dodd-Frank Act.208  Senate and House negotiators added a 
bank tax provision to the bill in late June in order to offset the additional 
regulatory costs of the Act.209  Senator Scott Brown—the Republican elected 
to replace the late Edward Kennedy—balked at the new tax, writing a letter to 
Senator Dodd and Representative Frank threatening to withhold his support 
for the bill.210  Brown’s support was crucial for passage of Dodd-Frank, which 
could not survive the Senate without 60 votes.211  Almost immediately, the tax 
was dropped from the bill, which Brown did ultimately support along with two 
other Republican Senators.212  
The dropped provision would have imposed a “financial crisis special 
assessment.”213  The assessment was not permanent revenue.  Instead, it would 
208 See David M. Herszenhorn, Bank Tax is Dropped in Overhaul of Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2010.  
209 See Mike Ferullo, Lawmakers Remove $19 Billion Bank Levy in Bid to Secure 
Senate Support for Reform, BNA BANKING DAILY (June 30, 2010). 
210 See Herszenhorn, supra note 208.  
211 GREGORY P. WILSON, MANAGING TO THE NEW REGULATORY REALITY: DOING 
BUSINESS UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT 65 (2011); see Matt Viser, Brown’s Threat 
Gets Bank Tax Removed, BOS. GLOBE (June 30, 2010), 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/06/30/browns_threat_
gets_bank_tax_removed/ [https://perma.cc/NQP9-445B].  
212 See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress – 2nd Session (Conference 
Report to Accompany H.R. 4173), July 15, 2010, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congres
s=111&session=2&vote=0028 [https://perma.cc/79UL-53KW]; GERALD P. WILSON, 
MANAGING TO THE NEW REGULATORY REALITY: DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE DODD-
FRANK ACT 64–65 (2011).  
213 Characterizing the June 25, 2010 agreement is difficult.  A conference 
committee of House and Senate negotiators approved a conference report containing 
the tax on June 25, 2010.  Responding to Senator Brown’s threat, the conferees 
amended their report, which they issued on June 29, 2010.  Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 111-
4173, at 2306 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), 
http://housedocs.house.gov/rules/finserv/111_hr4173_finsrvcr.pdf 
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have raised $19 billion (or 133% of Dodd-Frank’s 10-year costs, whichever 
was less)214 and would have been collected over four years.215  By dropping 
the assessment, Congress needed to find alternative revenue or spending cuts 
to pay for the costs of Dodd-Frank.  They found it by curtailing the much-hated 
TARP and by increasing FDIC premiums.216   
The assessment would have applied to financial institutions with over $50 
billion in assets (or hedge funds with over $10 billion in assets).217  The 
proposed text did not define a rate or a taxable base, but simply granted 
regulators the authority to enact a levy based on a variety of factors.218  The 
factors could include any “risk-related factors as [the Financial Stability 
Oversight] Council may determine to be appropriate.”219  The proposed 
language did list some factors clearly relevant to systemic risk, like leverage, 
activities, and interconnectedness.220  Other factors related to non-risk policy 
goals, such as “the company’s importance as a source of credit for low-income, 
minority, or underserved communities and the impact the failure of such 
company would have on the availability of credit in such communities.”221 
Amounts collected would have been placed in a newly created “financial 
crisis special assessment fund” maintained by the FDIC.222  Interestingly, the 
fund would not have been used for general revenue, bailout costs, or for any 
other particular purpose.223  Instead, the FDIC would have simply maintained 
the fund until 2035 and then would have been used to pay down the federal 
debt.224  
The limited life of the assessment, the use of the funds, and the context in 
which both were proposed all indicate that the assessment was not a serious 
attempt at corrective taxation.  It was simply a mechanism to satisfy federal 
budgetary rules.  The statutory language described who would pay the fee but 
shed few clues on how regulators would assess the levy.  
[https://perma.cc/U49Z-ETEG] [hereinafter Tentative Report].  The financial crisis 
special assessment is levied by Tentative Report § 1601. 
214 Tentative Report, supra note 213, at 2306 (§ 1601(a)). 
215 Id. at 2307 (§ 1601(b)). 
216 See WILSON, supra note 211, at 65; Viser, supra note 211. 
217 Tentative Report, supra note 213, at 2308–09 (§ 1601(f)).  
218 Id. at 2309–12 (§ 1601(g), (h)). 
219 Id. at 2312 (§ 1601(g)(13)).  
220 Id. at 2310–11 (§ 1601(g)(3)–(5)). 
221 Id. at 2311 (§ 1601(g)(7)). 
222 Id. at 2306, 2308 § (1602(a), (e)). 
223 Id. at 2309–12 (§ 1602(g)). 
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2017 TAXING SYSTEMIC RISK 47
C.   Obama Administration’s Proposed Financial Crisis Responsibility 
Fee 
On January 14, 2010, President Obama proposed a “Financial Crisis 
Responsibility Fee” on large financial firms.225  The tax rate would have been 
0.15% and imposed on the liabilities, other than deposits, of the firms.226  The 
stated goal of the reform was restitution of TARP payouts tinged with 
retribution over large executive bonuses.227  According to the President, “My 
commitment is to recover every single dime the American people are owed. 
And my determination to achieve this goal is only heightened when I see 
reports of massive profits and obscene bonuses at the very firms who owe their 
continued existence to the American people.”228  
The fee would remain in place for ten to twelve years and collect enough 
funds to cover the government’s outlays in the TARP program.229  Presumably, 
the tax would end once the government recouped its TARP outlays.  When 
originally proposed, the expected costs of TARP were $117 billion.230  When 
President Obama reproposed the fee a year later in February 2011, the 
expected costs had fallen to $48 billion,231 and in December 2011 they stood 
at $34 billion.232  
The fee would apply to financial firms with more than $50 billion in 
consolidated assets.  Firms that received no direct TARP assistance would still 
pay, under the theory that they indirectly benefited from TARP.233  The fee 
225 See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, President 
Obama Proposes Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee to Recoup Every Last Penny for 
American Taxpayers (Jan. 14, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/president-obama-proposes-financial-crisis-responsibility-fee-recoup-
every-last-penn [https://perma.cc/QK2J-JDYR]  [hereinafter Fee Proposal].  
226 See Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee Fact Sheet, 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg506.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/H746-ALZJ] 2 (Jan. 14, 2010), [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
227 Id. 
228 See Fee Proposal, supra note 225. 
229 See Fact Sheet, supra note 226. 
230 Id. 
231 See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 Budget of the United States 
23 (Feb. 2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2012-
BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLK8-MMSK]. 
232 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM 2 (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/126xx/doc12611/12-16-TARP_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9ZLV-UYMZ]. 
233 See Fact Sheet, supra note 226, at 2. 
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would be 15 basis points (0.15%) of the firms “covered liabilities,” defined as 
(1) total assets reduced by (2) tier one capital and (3) FDIC insured deposits.234 
Because the fee expires when all TARP expenses have been restored, the 
proposal is not a corrective tax.  If made permanent, however, the fee could 
arguably serve a regulatory purpose because it would be levied on firm 
leverage.  Tier one capital, in rough terms, is firm equity.  More equity reduces 
leverage and also the fee.  Deposits are certainly a form of debt, but they are 
already “taxed” by the FDIC insurance system.235  The rate of the fee—15 
basis points—roughly corresponds to IMF estimates of the value of 
governmental support of “too big to fail entities.”236  
D.   Analysis 
Proponents of liability levies typically frame their goals in terms of 
restitution (e.g., the Obama administration) or the financing of future bailouts 
(e.g., the derailed Dodd-Frank fee).  They do not appear to be focused on 
regulating conduct.  Liability levies do, however, raise the cost of debt 
financing, or leverage.  Highly leveraged firms are more likely to fail and 
impose costs on the financial system and economy as a whole.  Thus, the 
liability levies have some plausible relation to systemic risk.  
The liability levies, though, are the roughest of tools.  The premier system 
of regulating financial institutions, the Basel Accords, started more than 
twenty years ago out of the recognition that bank leverage does not adequately 
measure systemic risk.237  Consider two banks.  Both have $90 billion of 
liabilities (including deposits) and $10 billion of equity.  They must, of course, 
both have $100 billion of assets.  One bank invests in risky assets that have a 
50% chance of falling by more than $10 billion this year.  This bank, as a 
result, has a 50% chance of become insolvent.  The other bank invests in low-
risk assets that have only a 1% chance of falling by more than $10 billion, 
producing only a 1% chance of becoming insolvent.  The two banks present 
radically different systemic risks, but they are subject to the same levy. 
Similarly, the liability levies do not adequately address derivatives, which very 
often have the economic payoffs of leveraged investments.238  
Nor does it account for the stability of the firm’s debt financing.  Short-
term, wholesale financing (like repo) is far more unstable during a crisis than 
long-term debt.239  Finally, it does nothing to address how connected the 
institution is to the financial system.  A hedge fund might make highly 
234 Id. 
235 Cf. supra Part I.E.3 (describing deposit insurance). 
236 See IMF, supra note 187, at 14. 
237 See supra Part I.E.2. 
238 See generally HULL, supra note 27, Ch. 35.  
239 See supra Part I.C. 
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leveraged bets on publicly traded stock.  If the fund fails, it may stress its 
lenders but otherwise cause little distress in the markets. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The theory of a regulatory tax on finance sounds promising.  Systemic risk 
is an externality, like carbon emissions or pollution.  Systemic-risk “polluters” 
(large banks, etc.) privately profit while imposing costs on everyone else. 
Direct regulation may well limit the amount of systemic risk at individual firms 
and in the economy as a whole.  It cannot, however, effectively allocate the 
ability to emit systemic risk among various firms.  
A tax on systemic risk could theoretically accomplish this goal by placing 
a marginal cost upon each unit of systemic risk.  If subject to tax, systemic risk 
becomes just like any other economic input (labor, capital, etc.).  The market 
then automatically allocates the input to the most efficient producer.  Another 
advantage of a systemic risk tax could be in political economy if tax collectors 
are more resilient to agency capture than financial regulators.  Finally, a 
systemic-risk tax would produce public revenue, much needed in an era of 
large budget deficits in the United States and Europe.  
But a tax needs some reasonably ascertainable base subject to tax. 
Environmental taxes can rely on a physical tax base (e.g., carbon emissions). 
Defining the right base for a corrective tax on finance is far harder.  To do so, 
we must move beyond metaphors (systemic risk is a “shock”) and economic 
abstractions (systemic risk is an externality).  We must, instead, define some 
accounting or transactional measure that operationalizes the metaphors and 
abstractions.  To date, policymakers and commentators have failed to do so. 
Mainstream proposals tax three basic measures: financial transactions, 
financial activities, or firm leverage.  None of these measures, though, has a 
strong conceptual relationship to systemic risk.  More esoteric measures 
proposed in the finance literature fail as well. 
This is not the final word on financial sector taxes.  Alternative 
justifications (like simply raising revenue) exist.  Moreover, the problems 
identified in this Article are practical in nature.  Future researchers may yet 
arrive at a good, administrable measure of systemic risk.  This Article does not 
end any debate, but it will hopefully guide the discussion on taxing the 
financial sector.  
